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F iscal decentralization and local government efficiency: does relative 
deprivation matter? 
 
J ose Manuel Alonso and R hys Andrews 
 
Abstract  
Fiscal decentralization arguably improves government efficiency because it enhances 
responsiveness to local policy issues and incentivises fiscal discipline. However, critics suggest 
that central control over local spending is necessary to equalize fiscal outcomes between 
prosperous and deprived areas. Using a two-stage analysis, we investigate the validity of these 
arguments by analysing the separate and combined effects of fiscal decentralization and socio-
economic deprivation on the productive efficiency of English local governments during 2002-
2008. The results suggest that decentralization is positively related to productive efficiency and 
that there is a negative relationship between socio-economic deprivation and efficiency. 
Further analysis reveals that deprivation weakens the positive decentralization-efficiency 
relationship, calling into question simplistic proposals for fiscal decentralization.  
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Introduction 
The decentralization of tax and spending powers to sub-national levels of government has 
become one of the most popular policy prescriptions in countries all across the world 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). In pursuit of improved economic efficiency, national 
governments have established new devolved institutions, ceded long-held powers to lower 
levels of government, and encouraged those units of government to raise more of their own 
revenues (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). Behind this movement towards greater local and 
regional control over public expenditure, is the notion that it will improve allocative efficiency 
because subnational governments are more responsive to local demands (Oates, 1999), and 
enhance productive efficiency because with greater fiscal responsibility comes greater fiscal 
discipline (Asatryan, Feld and Geys, 2015). Despite the popularity of decentralization 
initiatives across the globe, there remain important lacunae in our understanding of the 
dynamics of this ubiquitous policy. In particular, surprisingly few studies address the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and the productive efficiency of sub-national 
governments (for rare exceptions see Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina, 2010; Barankay 
and Lockwood, 2007). Still less research has examined the boundary conditions of this 
relationship, especially whether providing services to more deprived populations harms the 
decentralization-efficiency relationship. To address these gaps in the literature, we investigate 
the separate and, critically, the combined effects of local budgetary autonomy and socio-
economic deprivation on productive efficiency in the English local government system.  
A lthough fiscal decentralization has become the default policy position for many 
national (and international) institutions, it has not been without its critics. The ‘new 
regionalists’, in particular, suggest that centralizing control over local public services can be a 
means to averting debt formation, administrative duplication and corruption – all of which 
contribute to inefficiency (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). In addition, fiscal centralization 
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may represent the best means for institutionalizing the fiscal discipline and budgetary 
management required to equalize spatial variations in public sector performance (Prud’homme, 
1995). Research suggests that subnational governments can run up large budget deficits in the 
expectation that national authorities will ‘bale them out’ (Rodden, 2002). Local governments 
serving deprived populations may be particularly prone to such financial mismanagement, 
especially as their capacity for generating tax revenue is typically more restricted than those 
serving prosperous populations (Zafra-Gomez and Perez, 2010). Supporters of fiscal 
centralization suggest, therefore, that where central control over resource allocation is 
extended, fiscal outcomes across more and less deprived communities can be equalized because 
the influence of local interest groups over service delivery is restricted and service providers 
must meet universal standards (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003).    
Do local governments with greater control over their budgets have higher levels of 
productive efficiency? Are local governments serving deprived populations less efficient? And, 
critically, does deprivation harm the productive efficiency of local governments with higher 
levels of budgetary autonomy? In this paper, we seek to provide answers to these important 
theoretical questions through a two-stage analysis of the productive efficiency of English local 
governments between the years 2002 and 2008. The paper will begin by developing theoretical 
arguments about the efficiency rationale that lies behind fiscal decentralization, before 
considering how socio-economic deprivation poses a challenge to local government efficiency. 
The ways in which the efficiency gains from fiscal decentralization might be contingent upon 
deprivation will then be explored. Then, measures of local government efficiency, fiscal 
decentralization, relative deprivation and appropriate control variables are identified and 
described. Thereafter, the results of the statistical modelling that we undertake are presented 
and discussed. Finally, the conclusion will elucidate theoretical and practical implications. 
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F iscal decentralization and local government efficiency 
The relative merits of fiscal decentralization have been debated at length in the academic 
literature (see Rodden, Eskeland and L itvack, 2003). One important strand of these debates has 
been the argument that the budgetary autonomy of sub-national government can minimise the 
costs of public service production (Ebel and Y ilmaz, 2002). In fact, much of the theoretical and 
empirical literature in favour of fiscal decentralization has been concerned with the efficient 
provision of local public services (e.g. Besley and Coate, 2003; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; 
Tiebout, 1956). Within that literature, the efficiency case for extending local control over 
public budgets typically rests on two inter-related arguments.  
Firstly, by increasing budgetary autonomy, fiscal decentralization empowers local 
governments to make decisions independently of higher tiers of government – a development 
hypothesised to lead to greater political responsiveness, which, in turn, enhances productive 
efficiency (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). In theory, locally elected representatives are more 
alert to the needs of local people than national or regional politicians (Inman and Rubinfield, 
1997). By gaining greater control over their budgets, local governments therefore become 
better able to tailor public policies and services to citizens’ demands (Besley and Coates, 2003; 
L indaman and Thurmaier, 2002). This generates productive efficiency gains because the costs 
associated with designing and producing the package of public goods that will meet local needs 
are correspondingly reduced. At the same time, citizens served by autonomous local 
governments may be more motivated to influence political decisions via the ballot box 
(Seabright, 1996) or other forms of civic participation (De Mello, 2011). Although the policy 
choices of sub-national governments may be susceptible to capture by local elites (Bardhan 
and Mookarjee, 2000), the positive reciprocal relationship between local autonomy and 
political engagement can result in a virtuous cycle of efficiency improvement. Moreover, as 
trust between citizens and politicians increases, so too does the potential for co-production of 
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public services – a development likely to improve performance and reduce production costs 
(De Witte and Geys, 2013). 
Secondly, related to arguments about political responsiveness, fiscal decentralization 
can improve productive efficiency due to the increased visibility of performance accountability 
in autonomous local governments. In particular, by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of 
local versus national institutions, fiscal decentralization could elicit the efficiency-enhancing 
effects associated with Tiebout competition. According to Tiebout (1956), citizens’ awareness 
of the performance of their own and neighbouring local governments can exert downward 
pressure on the costs of public service production. Citizens and businesses can keep the ratio 
of local taxes to service benefits to desired levels through the threat of ‘voting with their feet’ 
in search of a better deal elsewhere. Local governments with more budgetary autonomy are 
likely to benefit from the competitive effects of potential ‘fiscal migration’ to a greater extent 
because: a) they have greater discretion over policies to compete for businesses and 
households; b) they have a stronger economic incentive for retaining tax revenue; and, c) they 
have a stronger electoral incentive for demonstrating the success of local policies (Niskanen, 
1971; Salmon, 1987).   
Each of these arguments for fiscal decentralization rest on important assumptions about 
the “median voter”. The supposed benefits of political responsiveness are dependent upon the 
average citizen having the ability and opportunities to hold local representatives to account 
effectively (Romer and Rosenthal, 1979). The potentially positive effects of Tiebout 
competition are dependent upon the “median voter” being able to accurately compare the costs 
and benefits of living between jurisdictions (Dollery and Worthington, 1996). In this context, 
English local government represents a good test case for examining the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and productive efficiency.  
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Despite the presence of a strong central state, local politics and democracy remain an 
indispensable feature of community governance across England (Ward et al., 2015). In 
addition, citizens routinely receive information on how their property tax (the only tax levied 
by English local governments) is spent, which facilitates the comparison of tax-service 
packages across jurisdictions at the heart of Tiebout competition. Indeed, Borge and Rattsø 
(2008) show that locally-administered property tax incentivises cost control by local 
governments because it simulates citizen interest in local public services. Finally, during the 
study period (2002-08), the performance of all major English local governments was ranked 
on a widely publicised scale (Andrews et al., 2005). The availability of this information too 
may have a salutary effect. James and John (2007) find that the ruling parties of local 
governments known to be performing poorly experienced a drop in their electoral support. 
There is currently a dearth of evidence on budgetary autonomy and local government 
efficiency from the English setting. A  recent cross-country analysis produced by Sow and 
Razafimahefa (2015) confirms that fiscal decentralization can improve productive efficiency – 
a finding prefigured in Barankay and Lockwood’s (2007) study of Swiss Cantons. However, 
these landmark studies utilise single indicators of education or healthcare output. A lthough this 
approach may reduce identification problems associated with aggregation bias, it does not 
capture the true nature of the local government production function, which is typically 
characterised by the assembly of multiple outputs. Widmer and Zweifel (2012) find a positive 
relationship between decentralization and a multidimensional indicator of the output of Swiss 
cantons, as do Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010) for a sample of Spanish municipalities, but neither 
of these studies applies an estimator that adequately controls for unobserved heterogeneity.  
In summary, then, although there are competing arguments about the merits of fiscal 
decentralization, the evidence to date mostly confirms that it has beneficial efficiency 
implications (though see Malesky, Nguyen and Tran, 2014). Furthermore, the basic prediction 
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that local budgetary autonomy will drive efficiency upwards remains a guiding principle 
behind numerous policy initiatives.  Hence, we hypothesise:   
 
H1 - decentralization will be positively related to local government efficiency 
 
A  large number of exogenous factors may influence public service efficiency, but perhaps the 
most important is socio-economic deprivation. According to Townsend (1987), deprivation is 
caused by lack of resources, ‘such as lack of types of diet, clothing, housing, household 
facilities, and fuel and environmental, educational, working and social conditions, activities 
and facilities that are customary’ (131). People living in deprived communities thus have more 
urgent and complex needs than those living elsewhere. Because of this, deprivation is claimed 
to adversely affect public service provision, principally because it increases costs. For example, 
primary health care teams work harder in deprived areas (Carlisle, Avery and Marsh, 2002). In 
fact, the assumption behind fiscal equalization schemes is that a centrally determined transfer 
system is required to restrict the potentially vicious cycle of fiscal migration and economic 
decline that might result from unrestricted Tiebout competition between sub-national 
governments (Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski, 1974).  
In addition to increased production costs in deprived communities, the resources 
available to co-produce service outputs are likely to be lower. Disadvantaged individuals and 
families simply have less time and money to add to service production than their more 
prosperous counterparts (Williams, 2003). For example, poor parents cannot subsidize state 
schools (e.g. through donations or unpaid help) or pay for home tuition to raise their children’s 
school examination performance. Indeed, numerous studies show that deprivation harms 
school achievement levels (e.g. Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009; West, 
Pennell, Travers and West 2001). A t the same time, local governments serving deprived 
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communities may have higher labour costs as they struggle to recruit and retain staff, and 
confront higher rates of absenteeism and burnout (Audit Commission, 2002). A lthough little 
research directly addresses the link between deprivation and productive efficiency, several 
studies show that it has a negative effect on the performance of local public services (e.g. 
Andrews et al., 2005; Romero, Haubrich and Maclean, 2010). Due to the triple pressures of 
high need, low co-production capacity and staffing issues associated with serving deprived 
communities, our second hypothesis is therefore that: 
 
H2 - deprivation will be negatively related to local government efficiency 
 
Prior theory and evidence suggests that fiscal decentralization will generate efficiency 
improvements because local governments with greater budgetary autonomy are incentivised to 
respond to local needs and demands (Sow and Razafimahefa, 2015). By contrast, socio-
economic deprivation poses a considerable efficiency problem for local governments, as it is 
associated with much greater quantity and diversity of need, thereby raising the cost of 
providing services to a good standard (Andrews et al., 2005). As a result, it is conceivable that 
the efficiency gains from fiscal decentralization are contingent upon deprivcation.  
For its critics, fiscal decentralization tends towards inequitable outcomes for more 
deprived communities because the needs in such communities are so great that the local 
governments that serve them have little scope for adjusting the tax-service package in a way 
that would attract potentially mobile residents and businesses from elsewhere (Flatters, 
Henderson and Mieszkowski, 1974). For local governments with a higher level of budgetary 
autonomy, this problem may be especially acute.  
While, in theory, they have more control over resource allocation, in practice, 
autonomous governments serving deprived communities may have less meaningful discretion 
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over service delivery choices due to the deep-rooted nature of the structural poverty that they 
confront. The chronic issues that poverty poses can make investment in high-quality labour-
intensive public services a ‘bad risk’ (Le Grand, 1991) that autonomous local governments 
may avoid in favour of expenditure on the kinds of capital projects that attract businesses 
(J imenez, 2014). Moreover, governments serving deprived populations are unlikely to be able 
to draw on the kind of coproductive capacity that is available to their more affluent neighbours 
(Smith, 1994). Nor are they as likely to be pushed to do things differently by disgruntled 
middle-class service users with high expectations of service providers (Duffy, 2000). As a 
result, the scope for efficiency-enhancing policy divergence in autonomous governments 
operating in deprived areas is likely to be constrained by the chronic needs of the population 
and the lack of support for alternatives to conventional policy solutions. 
L ittle research has systematically examined whether the efficiency gains from fiscal 
decentralization are contingent upon deprivation at the local level. Cross-country research 
suggests that decentralization leads to higher productive efficiency in more affluent countries 
(Sow and Razafimahefa, 2015), and that it may result in worse outcomes for those populations 
in greatest need (L indaman and Thurmaier, 2002). However, little is known about how this 
process works within a single local government system. Evidence from Switzerland indicates 
that attempts to equalize resource disparities between cantonal governments can lead to 
efficiency losses in both prosperous and less-advantaged governments (Widmer and Zweifel, 
2012). However, that study does not model the combined effects of decentralization and fiscal 
need on productive efficiency. Given the problems that socio-economic deprivation poses for 
public service providers, it seems likely that it will negatively impact on other more positive 
institutional influences. Hence, although decentralization can bring benefits to communities by 
ensuring that local policy-makers are responsible for developing solutions to local problems, 
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the scope for them to do this in a cost-efficient way in deprived areas may be more restricted 
than in prosperous communities. Our third and final hypothesis is, therefore: 
 
H3 - deprivation will weaken the positive decentralization-efficiency relationship 
 
Methodology and data 
To test the separate and combined effects of decentralization and deprivation on the productive 
efficiency of local governments, we deploy a two-stage analysis. First, productive efficiency is 
measured through a V alue-for-Money (V FM) ratio constructed using publicly available 
measures of service expenditure and quality, and through a non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) (see section 3.2). In the second stage, we employ statistical models to evaluate 
the effects of decentralization and deprivation on productive efficiency. Specifically, our 
second stage baseline specification is the following dynamic panel data model: 
1
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where EFF it is one of our measures of productive efficiency in local government i at 
time t. Decit is the itth observation of an indicator of fiscal decentralization. Deprivatit is the 
itth observation of the English Index of Multiple Deprivation. Zit is the itth observation on K 
control variables accounting for external constraints on efficiency. µ i denotes the unobservable 
government specific effect, δ t represents the unobservable specific time effect (common to all 
governments) and ε it the remainder stochastic disturbance term.  
                                                            
1
 9mpiricaly, a panel-b ased approach is more appropriate than a cross-section analysis b ecause, among other 
reasons, omitted variables or unobserved local governments’ characteristics potentialy affecting efficiency can 
be modeled by including an individual government effect. Ln addition, a dynamic model specification wil alow 
us to test whether productive efficiency in time period t is affected b y past efficiency achievements. 
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However, equation (1) provides only a test of the separate effects of fiscal 
decentralization and deprivation on productive efficiency. In other words, it can show whether 
decentralization and deprivation are individually related to efficiency but not if the efficiency 
gains from fiscal decentralization are contingent upon deprivation. To do so, we include the 
following interaction term (Dec*Deprivat): 
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An important concern when estimating equations (1) and (2) is the correlation between 
the lagged dependent variable (EFF i.t-1) and the error term (ε it). Nickell (1981) showed that the 
commonly applied within-group estimator is biased and inconsistent when the number of time 
periods (T) is small and the number of cross-sectional units (N) large. To overcome this 
problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
procedure, which takes first differences to eliminate individual specific effects, and then 
instruments the potentially endogenous right-hand side variables in the first-differenced 
equation using levels of the series lagged at least two periods. This difference-GMM estimator 
was initially developed for samples with a large number of cross-sectional units and a small 
number of time periods. However, recent studies suggest that GMM approaches may perform 
poorly when the number of units (N) is not large enough (see, for example, Bun and 
Windmeijer, 2010). Our sample is relatively small (148 local governments) which may affect 
the reliability of GMM estimates.  
To overcome this, we apply the Least Squares Dummy V ariable Corrected (LSDV C) 
estimator derived initially by K iviet (1995) and extended to unbalanced panels by Bruno 
(2005). The LSDV C estimator performs an analytical correction of the LSDV  bias in short 
panels through an approximation of the finite-sample bias (see K iviet, 1995; Bruno, 2005). 
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Bruno (2005) found that the LSDV C estimator outperforms difference-GMM in panels with a 
relatively low number of units and a number of time periods less than or equal to ten, which is 
our case. In addition, as a further precaution, we report estimates from a bootstrapped bias 
correction (BBC) for the fixed effects estimator in dynamic panels derived by Everaert and 
Pozzi (2007).
2
 Hence, we rely on the LSDV C estimator, but report difference-GMM and BBC 
results to benchmark the robustness of the results.  
A lthough these methodological approaches appear well-suited for the analysis of our 
first measure of productive efficiency, i.e. the V FM ratio, using conventional linear regressions 
to explain the variation of non-parametric estimates, such as the DEA scores for our alternative 
productive efficiency measure, may be problematic due to, among other reasons, the potential 
correlation of efficiency scores and the explanatory variables   (Balaguer-Coll, Prior and 
Tortosa-Ausina, 2007). For this reason, we complement our analysis of DEA efficiency 
estimates with the double bootstrap procedure described in Simar and Wilson (2007). 
 
Study context and data 
The dataset for our study has been collected from the full population of 148 English single and 
upper tier local governments for the period 2002 to 2008. These are elected bodies with a 
Westminster-style cabinet system of political management made up of senior members of the 
ruling political party. A lthough the power of central government in the UK  means that English 
“local government can only act within the bounds set by Parliament” (John and Copus 2011: 
29-30), local governments manage about a quarter of the total public sector budget and retain 
a strong capacity for adapting to new circumstances. Locally elected politicians collectively 
decide on the approach to implementation of national policy frameworks on the basis of advice 
                                                            
2
 This estimator also aims to correct the b ias of the dynamic fixed-effects estimator. The main practical 
difference b etween the . . /  and the [ S5V /  estimators is that the . . /  does not rely on a strict set of 
assumptions such as homoscedasticity (see, 5e V os, 9veraert, and wuyssen, 2015). 
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from professional local government managers led by a chief executive officer. In terms of 
public service responsibilities, single-tier (London boroughs, metropolitan districts and unitary 
authorities) and upper-tier governments (county councils) are multi-purpose authorities 
responsible for providing services in the areas of education (e.g. primary, secondary and 
tertiary schooling), social care (e.g. nursing homes, supported independent living), 
environmental services (e.g. waste management, land use planning), and leisure and culture 
services (e.g. sports centres, libraries). With the exception of county councils, they also provide 
services in the areas of housing (e.g. sheltered accommodation) and housing benefits (e.g. rent 
subsidies for low-income individuals).  
In addition to having more responsibilities than local governments in most other 
countries, English local governments tend to be bigger and to vary considerably in size, mainly 
according to whether they serve urban or rural populations. County councils in rural England, 
in particular, are very large (mean population of 692,615), while unitary authorities serving 
small cities and large towns are small (mean population of 181,844) when compared with other 
English local governments (overall mean population of 340,320). For the purposes of our study, 
we include the full population of single and upper-tier local governments, which cover the 
entire geographical area of England. These local governments correspond to NUTS 3 statistical 
regions, though a small number of them are grouped together, and others split up under this 
classification. 
 
Efficiency measures 
The analysis presented here focuses first on publicly available measures of government 
efficiency that were collected and published by the United K ingdom (UK)’s Audit 
Commission. More specifically, we follow Andrews and Entwistle (2015) and construct a ratio 
of the overall expenditures to overall outputs/outcomes delivered by each local government. 
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To do so, we rely for the outcome side of our productive efficiency ratio (or, in other words, 
the V FM ratio) on the core service performance elements of the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessments (CPAs) that were undertaken by the Audit Commission between the years 2002 
and 2008. The core service performance score was based on judgements made by the Audit 
Commission about the quality of key services (children and young people, adult social care, 
environment, housing, libraries and leisure, and benefits). These quality judgements ranged 
from 1 (poor) to 4 (excellent) drawing largely on statutory performance indicators, but also 
user surveys and on-site inspections. For instance, in the case of environmental services, local 
governments with 35% or more performance indicators, such as waste recycling rates and the 
number of missed bin collections, at or below the bottom quartile for England were scored 1, 
whereas those achieving 35% or more in the top quartile with none in the bottom quartile were 
scored 4 (Audit Commission, 2005).  
To construct an overall government-level performance score, the 4-point scores for 
each key service were weighted in terms of relative importance and budget (for a detailed 
description see Andrews et al., 2005). By drawing on such a comprehensive measure of local 
government performance, we capture each government’s achievements across the full 
spectrum of outputs that they are responsible for producing. For example, as part of their duty 
to provide children and young people’s services, English local governments (LGs) are 
responsible for all of the activities associated with nursery, primary, secondary and tertiary 
education and those associated with supporting the well-being of children in social care.  
For the input side of the efficiency ratio we draw upon the total per capita service 
expenditure of each local government, excluding expenditure on central administration. This 
measure captures the staffing costs for production units, such as schools, nursing homes, and 
waste collection and disposal teams, plus the maintenance costs associated with the buildings 
and equipment required for service production. Hence, we derive a productive efficiency ratio 
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for our analysis by dividing the core performance score by the service expenditure measure. 
Figure 1 visually depicts the time series variation of both components of our productive 
efficiency ratio, along with the ratio itself, indicating that the variation in efficiency comes 
from changes in performance and in expenditure. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
A lthough our first efficiency measure departs from the non-parametric approaches in 
some of the prior literature on local government efficiency (e.g. Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; De 
Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Giménez and Prior, 2007; Worthington, 2000), we believe it to be 
a robust and policy-relevant measure. In particular, the core service performance measure is an 
independently audited indicator of the overall quality of local government outputs that has 
performed well in a range of different empirical studies (e.g. Boyne et al, 2012; Damanpour et 
al, 2009; Revelli, 2010). Moreover, during the study period, this output measure was the one 
that mattered most to local citizens, UK  central government and local governments themselves 
(James and John, 2007; Turner et al., 2004).   
Despite the confidence we have in our efficiency ratio, we acknowledge the difficulty 
of measuring local government efficiency accurately and the subjective nature of the criteria 
informing the derivation of the core service performance scores. Following the 
recommendations of prior studies (e.g. De Borger and K erstens, 1996), we therefore 
complement our analysis of the V FM ratio with a first-stage estimation of productive efficiency 
by means of DEA techniques applied to the pooled data set, where each observation is 
accounted for as a single unit. More specifically, we compute radial distance measures based 
on the Debreu–Farrell notion of efficiency. The first question that arises when selecting the 
DEA model is its orientation, in the sense that either the inputs or outputs are considered 
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beyond the control of public managers. Public managers have, in general, greater control over 
the level of inputs than output and, in many cases, the emphasis is more on controlling costs 
rather than on increasing demand for public services. Hence, an input orientated model appears 
to be the most suitable for our study. A second question of interest when formulating a DEA 
model is the returns to scale assumption. In this paper, we assume variable returns to scale, 
which seems appropriate as local governments may not be operating at an optimal scale (see, 
e.g., Worthington, 2000).  
DEA models require a careful selection of inputs and outputs. Here, the selection of 
outputs is based on the key services provided by local governments. As discussed in the main 
text, English single-tier and upper-tier governments are all responsible for providing education, 
social care, environmental, and leisure and culture services. We therefore include in our DEA 
model the following proxy indicators as outputs: (i) the number of pupils sitting the General 
Certificate of Secondary Education examination (education), (ii) older people helped to live at 
home (social care), (iii) tons of waste managed (environmental services), and (iv) population, 
which may proxy for leisure and culture services such as libraries and public sport facilities, as 
well as the various municipal administrative tasks (see, e.g., Borger and K erstens, 1996; 
Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007, 2010). The selection of these outputs has been conditioned by the 
availability of public information regarding these services throughout the study period. Finally, 
to capture inputs we use local governments’ total service expenditures as a proxy for the costs 
associated with local public service provision. This indicator denotes the total running expenses 
for the services in each government and year. A summary of outputs and inputs, along with 
descriptive statistics is provided in Appendix A ; Table A1. 
It is important to note that our productive efficiency measures capture different stages 
of the municipal production process. First, the V FM ratio indicates the financial cost of 
producing a given unit of service quality, reflecting the degree to which local government 
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activities result in welfare improvements. On the other hand, our DEA estimates indicate the 
ability of each municipality to minimize service expenditure within a certain fixed level of 
direct outputs, such as number of pupils, tons of waste managed, etc., not taking into account 
the welfare effects of producing these outputs (for a comprehensive overview of different 
stages of the municipal production process see, Bradford, Malt and Oates, 1996; Balaguer-Coll 
et al., 2010). 
 
Independent variables 
The primary independent variables of interest are those covariates measuring fiscal 
decentralization and deprivation. First, we capture the extent of fiscal decentralization by 
measuring the proportion of the overall local government expenditure that is funded via local 
property tax rather than central government transfers, also known as “expenditure autonomy” 
(Psycharis and Iliopoulou, 2016). The main general grant provided to English local 
governments is calculated on the basis of the need for specific public services, and in this way 
grant-based spending on key priorities can be controlled by central government. Nevertheless, 
local governments have discretion to allocate locally raised property tax in accordance with 
local priorities. The local property tax in England, known as the ‘council tax’, is the only tax 
levied by English local governments. Although council tax revenue varies to some extent 
according to the fiscal capacity of local governments, those serving more deprived 
communities that are more dependent upon council tax revenue confront harder policy choices 
than those serving more prosperous ones.  
We follow Sharma (2012) in interpreting our measure of fiscal decentralization as 
vertical fiscal asymmetry rather than vertical fiscal imbalance (see Sow and Razafinahefa, 
2015), which implies a prescription in favour of decentralization. We focus on fiscal 
asymmetry because the UK is known to have comparatively restricted autonomy over local 
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expenditure, even though much of that expenditure is managed at the local level and local 
democracy is well-established. According to Boex and Simatupang (2008), other measures of 
fiscal decentralization (e.g. % of public spending managed at the local level) do not capture 
local fiscal empowerment as effectively. The figures presented in Appendix A , Table A2 
highlight that there is considerable variation in the degree of budgetary autonomy across 
English local governments, with decentralization ranging from 7% up to nearly 41%. Figure 1 
above indicates that there was, on average, a negative trend in decentralization, particularly 
from 2003 onwards when central government investment in local public services increased.  
Our second independent variable of interest, i.e. deprivation, is measured using the 
average ward score in each local government area of the English Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD) published in 2000 by the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions, by 
the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2004 and by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government in 2007. This index is the standard measure of relative deprivation used by 
UK central government, and has been utilised in numerous previous studies (e.g. Romero et 
al., 2010). The mechanisms for allocating central grants to local governments in England seek 
to equalize levels of funding between deprived and prosperous communities (Senior, 1994). 
However, the combinative effects of its multiple dimensions may mean the actual influence of 
deprivation on productive efficiency exceeds that modelled within the grant allocation formula. 
Although deprivation is negatively correlated with fiscal decentralization, this does not 
generate multicollinearity likely to influence our analysis since the V ariance Inflation Factor 
(V IF) is below 4 for all explanatory variables and the average V IF is 2.4. 
Following the literature on determinants of local government efficiency, we include in 
our second stage regression models the following control variables; first, the lagged dependent 
variable to account for potential dynamic patterns in local governments’ efficiency. O’Toole 
and Meier (1999) argue that the outcomes of public service production are inherently auto-
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regressive – something studies have confirmed (e.g. Boyne et al., 2012). Second, annual 
estimates of the population of local governments are included to capture potential economies 
of scale (since population is included as an output variable in our DEA estimates, we do not 
include it as a regressor in the models explaining the DEA efficiency scores). Local 
governments serving big populations may be able to spread fixed costs and benefit from greater 
purchasing power (Boyne, 1995). Third, we add a measure capturing external grants allocated 
outside the needs-based funding formula. External grant revenue may be associated with lower 
productive efficiency, due to the ‘flypaper effect’ through which the receipt of external grants 
results in overspending by local governments (Hines and Thaler, 1995). 
Next, we include a measure of the political attitudes of local residents, gauged using 
the averaged Labour Party vote share in local elections between 2001 and 2007. Labour voters 
have a ‘collectivist’ disposition supporting public services (see Clarke et al. 2004), which may 
mean local governments in Labour-voting areas find it easier to achieve efficiency gains 
(Andrews and Entwistle, 2015). Finally, we include a dummy variable which takes a value of 
1 if the Labour party holds the local government or controls the relative majority of the cabinet 
posts. Left-wing local governments may be more susceptible to producerist capture than their 
right-wing counterparts who are more committed to exploring efficiency-enhancing service 
delivery models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). Descriptive statistics and data sources for all 
the variables used in our second-stage regression models are reported in Appendix A; Table 
A2. 
 
R esults 
In this section, we present the estimates of our empirical models. Tables 1 and 2 report the 
estimated parameters of the panel models using the V FM ratio as the dependent variable, 
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excluding and including the variable interacting our decentralization and deprivation measures 
(models described in Eqn. 1 and Eqn.2, respectively). 
Our preferred estimator, i.e. the LSDV C, assumes exogenous regressors, thus violating 
this assumption may yield invalid estimates. For this reason, we tested whether our variables 
of interest, i.e. decentralization and deprivation, can be treated as exogenous. To do so, we ran 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test of endogeneity after a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
specification. Briefly, the DWH test compares 2SLS and OLS estimates using within-
transformed variables to check whether the resulting coefficient vectors are “similar enough” 
which, if true, would confirm the null hypothesis that the potentially endogenous covariates 
can be treated as exogenous (see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2007, for a more detailed 
description of this test).  
In order to compute the DWH tests, we use as instruments the first three lags of the 
variables to be tested. Those internal instruments must satisfy the following conditions: first, 
they must be correlated with the potentially endogenous regressors and, second, they must 
satisfy orthogonality conditions, i.e., the instruments must be uncorrelated with the error term 
(exclusion restriction). Postestimation tests of instrument suitability suggest that these 
instruments are indeed relevant and valid. First, a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the potentially endogenous 
regressors (LM statistics equal to 14.063 and 146.29). In addition, Sargan tests of 
overidentifying restrictions suggest that the null hypothesis that the exclusion restriction is 
valid cannot be rejected under any specification at the 5% significance level (Sargan statistic 
equal to 0.276 and 5.95). Nonetheless, although Sargan tests support our instruments’ validity, 
the econometrics literature has suggested that internal instruments such as lagged variables 
may not be fully valid, since those potential factors inducing correlation between endogenous 
covariates and the error term can also potentially cause correlation between internal 
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instruments and the error term. Unfortunately, we were not able to find a set of suitable external 
instruments on this occasion, hence our DWH test results should be interpreted with caution. 
For both cases, DWH tests did not reject the null hypothesis that a non-instrumental 
estimator would yield consistent estimates (DWH test statistics equal to 1.580 and 0.385, 
respectively). which suggests that, taking into account the constraints posed by our internal 
instruments, endogeneity is not a serious concern for our models.  
We now discuss briefly the estimation results for the control variables before we focus 
on the separate and combined effects of fiscal decentralization and deprivation on efficiency. 
First, the lagged dependent variable, i.e. our productive efficiency ratio, takes positive values 
in all model specifications, and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level for all 
but the difference-GMM estimates, which suggest that the productive efficiency of English 
local governments may exhibit a positive dynamic pattern – as prior theory and evidence 
predicts (Meier and O’Toole, 1999). Next, population size is positively related to productive 
efficiency, confirming that local governments serving larger populations may benefit from 
economies of scale (see Walker and Andrews, 2015). By contrast, the measure of external 
grants per capita is negatively related to efficiency, indicating that the overspending associated 
with the ‘flypaper effect’ may be a problem for English local governments, as is the case in the 
United States (Hines and Thaler, 1995). Finally, our measures of a “collectivist” disposition 
amongst citizens and the political ideology of the ruling party do not have a statistically 
significant effect on local government efficiency in England, for the period under 
consideration.   
The findings support our first hypothesis that decentralization will be positively related 
to productive efficiency. The coefficient for decentralization in the linear-additive regression 
model reported in Table 1 is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
This finding is consistent with theories and evidence of the positive effects of fiscal 
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decentralization, which suggests that greater budgetary autonomy facilitates better and more 
efficient provision of public services (e.g. Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Sow and 
Razafimahefa, 2015). It also supports Borge and Rattsø’s (2008) arguments about the role that 
property tax can play in incentivising cost control. A lthough we are unable to disentangle the 
causal mechanisms that lie behind the positive decentralization-efficiency relationship, theory 
suggests that the political and competitive effects of budgetary autonomy can result in 
innovations in service delivery, efforts to cut red tape and motivate staff or the introduction of 
new management structures (see, for example, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Pollitt, 2007). 
The findings in Table 1 provide support for our second hypothesis. The coefficient for 
deprivation is negative and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This suggests, 
in line with previous studies (e.g. Romero et al., 2010), that local governments serving deprived 
populations face greater challenges than their counterparts serving affluent populations. This 
is an unfortunate consequence of the greater quantity and diversity of need within deprived 
areas, particularly as regards services such as education, health, housing and social benefits 
(Romero et al., 2010). The chronic needs of deprived populations are likely to be reflected in 
worse performance on both sides of the efficiency equation. Due to differences in the fiscal 
incentive system and co-productive capacity between prosperous and less fortunate local 
governments, the cost of providing services to deprived communities is high and the chances 
of achieving good service quality lower. At the same time, the problems posed by deprived 
populations may destabilize the positive effects of more propitious institutional influences on 
productive efficiency.    
 
[Table 1] 
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The inclusion of the variable interacting decentralization and deprivation within our 
model does not lead to a re-evaluation of our conclusions (see Table 2). First, the average 
marginal effect of decentralization on productive efficiency in the multiplicative interaction 
model is again positive and statistically significant (99% confidence level) and the average 
marginal effect of relative deprivation is still negative and significant at the 95% confidence 
level.
3
 The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant at the 99% confidence 
level. Hence, we find strong support for the suggestion that the efficiency gains from fiscal 
decentralization are contingent upon deprivation. Local governments with high levels of 
budgetary autonomy that serve deprived populations appear to be less efficient than other more 
autonomous governments that serve affluent populations. 
4
 
 
[Table 2] 
 
To fully explore this combined effect, an informative approach is to examine the 
marginal effect of decentralization across different levels of relative deprivation. Following 
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), we present this information by plotting the slope and 
confidence intervals of the marginal effects. Hence, Figure 2 illustrates the effect of 
decentralization on local governments’ productive efficiency contingent on relative deprivation 
levels. The solid sloping line plots the marginal effect of logged decentralization ratios as the 
                                                            
3
 Ln multiplicative interaction models, the coefficient for the moderator variab les show their relationship with 
the dependent variable when the moderated variab le is set to zero, which it is not plausible in our context. Cor 
this reason, it is necessary to compute marginal effects (see . rambor et al., 2006). 
 
4
 Lt should b e noted that although our [ S5V / , diff-Da a  and . . /  estimates point in the same direction, the 
estimated coefficients for the lagged dependent variable and the interaction term are significantly smaler 
when using the diff-Da a  approach. I owever, the latter approach was developed for situations with a large 
number of cross-sections and could be biased in situations, such as our case, where that number of cross-
sections is modest. Cor this reason, we believe the [ S5V /  approach is more suitab le for our data and it should 
provide more accurate results.  
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logged deprivation index varies, while the shaded bands represent the 95% confidence interval. 
The figure confirms that the relative level of deprivation is likely to have an important negative 
effect on the connection between decentralization and local governments’ efficiency, thus 
giving clear statistical support to our third hypothesis. That said, although deprivation clearly 
dampens the positive decentralization-efficiency relationship, figure 2 highlights that at no 
point within the range of the data is that relationship eradicated. Hence, while the efficiency-
enhancing effects of decentralization do decline in more deprived communities, it may still be 
a successful strategy for improving productive efficiency in such communities. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
In tables 3 and 4 we report results where our alternative measure of productive 
efficiency is regressed against our explanatory variables. For the LSDV C, difference-GMM 
and BBC models we use standard DEA estimates as the dependent variable, while for Simar 
and Wilson’s double bootstrap procedure (thereafter SW) we employ first a smoothed 
homogeneous bootstrap algorithm to compute bootstrapped DEA efficiency estimates, 
followed by a second-stage truncated regression of those bootstrapped efficiency scores (for a 
comprehensive description of this approach see Simar and Wilson, 2007). It is important to 
note that, to our knowledge, the SW procedure cannot accommodate the lagged dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable. Hence, lagged efficiency scores are excluded from our SW 
estimates. Nevertheless, in this case our results do not seems to depend on the estimation 
approach.      
Starting with the separate effect of decentralization and deprivation on the DEA 
efficiency scores, the results reported in Table 3 again support our first hypothesis regarding 
the positive effect of decentralization on productive efficiency. However, deprivation does not 
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have a negative relationship with the DEA measure of efficiency. This result likely reflects the 
differences between the two efficiency measures, with our V FM ratio explicitly incorporating 
output quality, which is particularly difficult for local governments serving deprived 
communities to improve. By contrast, the DEA scores are based on indicators of output 
quantity, which are included within the needs-based formula for the distribution of central 
government grants to local governments (Senior, 1994). For this reason, the DEA efficiency 
scores may be less sensitive to variations in the quantity of service need in deprived 
communities.  
 
[Table 3] 
 
Table 4 shows that the average marginal effect of decentralization on the DEA 
efficiency scores in the multiplicative interaction model is positive and statistically significant, 
and that the average marginal effect of deprivation is not statistically significant. Critically, the 
coefficient for the interaction term is again negative in all models. This result confirms our 
previous findings that deprivation weakens the positive decentralization-efficiency 
relationship, though in this instance deprivation behaves as what Sharma, Durand and Gur-
Arie (1981) term a “pure” moderator of that relationship, having no independent effect on the 
dependent variable itself. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of decentralization on the DEA 
measures contingent on deprivation levels. The figure highlights that deprivation is likely to 
have an important negative effect on the connection between decentralization and local 
governments’ efficiency, calling into question one-size-fits-all proposals for extending the 
budgetary autonomy of sub-national governments.   
 
[Table 4] 
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[Figure 3] 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigated the separate and combined effects of decentralization and 
deprivation on the productive efficiency of local governments in England. The statistical results 
support our hypothesis that fiscal decentralization is positively related to productive efficiency. 
Critically, our results also suggest that the benefits of this policy may be attenuated for local 
governments serving more deprived communities that generally appear to struggle to provide 
high-quality services at a reasonable cost.   
Our study offers support to advocates of fiscal decentralization and tends to confirm 
the argument that it can increase the productive efficiency of public service delivery. However, 
although greater budgetary autonomy appears to bring benefits to English local governments 
in terms of productive efficiency, these benefits appear to be contingent upon deprivation 
levels. The results suggest, therefore, that the balance of tax and spending powers between 
national and sub-national governments should be sensitive to the external socio-economic 
circumstances of different local governments. In particular, while our evidence indicates that 
local governments can potentially become more efficient by raising more of their own tax 
revenue, the efficiency gains that those serving deprived populations can realise by doing this 
may be small compared to those achievable in affluent areas. Since the benefits of 
decentralization might be unevenly spread across different dimensions of local government 
performance and different local government functions (see Letelier-Saavedra and Saez-
Lozano, 2015), it may be that budgetary autonomy should be encouraged in prosperous areas, 
but that a more nuanced evaluation of its costs and benefits is required in deprived areas. From 
this perspective, our findings contribute to wider discussions about the relative merits of one-
size-fits-all versus locally differentiated policy solutions, affirming that some form of 
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“selective decentralization” (Letelier and Ormeño, 2017) may represent the best means for 
addressing issues of public service provision. 
Our analysis has limitations that offer opportunities for further research. In particular, 
due to the lack of reliable indicators it was not possible for us to precisely identify the causal 
mechanisms explaining the positive effects of fiscal decentralization. Further quantitative and 
qualitative research could shed light on whether local governments/citizens’ empowerment or 
yardstick competition matter most when explaining productive efficiency improvements in the 
English context. In addition, due to data availability constraints we are restricted to evaluating 
fiscal asymmetry. Subsequent studies could investigate whether the relationships we identify 
hold for other relevant measures of fiscal decentralization, such as the local share of total 
government expenditure and taxation. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore whether the 
effects we identify vary across different local public services. The absence of a panel of data 
indicating how local governments allocated property tax to different services means we 
couldn’t pursue this line of enquiry. Nevertheless, service-level analysis would provide 
valuable information for improving the design of grant mechanisms and the exercise of 
budgetary autonomy.  
Finally, our research is restricted to a single national context. Evidence on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization, deprivation and productive efficiency from other 
settings, and from systematic comparative studies, could move our empirical understanding of 
fiscal decentralization further forward. In particular, it is possible that the results would be quite 
different in contexts with a more challenging economic, political and institutional environment 
than that present within England between 2002-2008.  For now, though, we can conclude that 
our study has contributed useful, if qualified, empirical support for the on-going advocacy of 
fiscal decentralization as a policy prescription. 
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T able 1. Decentralization, deprivation and productive efficiency (V alue-For-Money): 
Equation 1 estimates. 
 LSDV C DIFF-GMM BBC 
Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
Log(V FM)t-1 0.3728 0.0407 0.0522 0.0911 0.4792 0.0726 
Log(Decentralization) 0.7378 0.0864 0.7575 0.0991 0.7366 0.1039 
Log(Deprivation) -0.0988 0.0475 -0.1607 0.0564 -0.1030 0.0571 
Log(External Grants pc) -0.0316 0.0081 -0.0592 0.0125 -0.0358 0.0105 
Log(Population) 0.7447 0.2120 1.0269 0.2068 0.7772 0.2317 
Log(Labour vote share) -0.0508 0.0311 0.0624 0.0369 -0.0512 0.0347 
Labour Control 0.0093 0.0141 -0.0139 0.0128 0.0077 0.0146 
Observations 875  722  866  
Groups 148  148  148  
Wald-Chi2   674.21    
Notes: Logged values of continuous variables to deal with potential non-normal distributions. LSDV C robust standard 
errors computed through 5000 bootstrap replications.  LSDV C bias correction initialized by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
estimator. BBC initialization deterministic; resampling scheme wild bootstrap; 150 bootstrap samples used for 
inference.  
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T able 2. Decentralization, deprivation and productive efficiency (V alue-For-Money): 
Equation 2 estimates. 
 LSDV C DIFF-GMM BBC 
Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
Log(V FM)t-1 0.3775 0.0407 0.0710 0.0936 0.4784 0.0704 
Log(Decentralization) 1.7071 0.3080 1.2142 0.3434 1.7516 0.3135 
Log(Deprivation) 0.8606 0.2996 0.2717 0.3131 0.9062 0.3040 
Log(External Grants pc) -0.0309 0.0081 -0.0568 0.0123 -0.0353 0.0095 
Log(Population) 0.7376 0.2108 1.0311 0.2089 0.7595 0.1954 
Log(Labour vote share) -0.0632 0.0310 0.0586 0.0374 -0.0650 0.0362 
Labour Control 0.0106 0.0140 -0.0146 0.0123 0.0089 0.0145 
Log(Dec)*Log(Deprivat) -0.3116 0.0957 -0.1464 0.1008 -0.3275 0.1003 
Average Marginal Effects:      
Decentralization 0.7390 0.0859 0.7675 0.0976 0.7343 0.0927 
Deprivation -0.0937 0.0474 -0.1686 0.0560 -0.0965 0.0504 
Observations 875  722  866  
Groups 148  148  148  
Wald-Chi2   708.47    
Notes: LSDV C robust standard errors computed through 5000 bootstrap replications.  L SDV C bias correction 
initialized by Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. BBC initialization deterministic; resampling scheme wild bootstrap; 
150 bootstrap samples used for inference. 
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T able 3. Decentralization, deprivation and productive efficiency (DEA): Equation 1 
estimates. 
 LSDV C DIFF-GMM BBC SW 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
DEA scorest-1 0.3271 0.0375 0.3898 0.1558 0.3941 0.1153   
Log(Decentralization) 0.3436 0.0486 0.5025 0.0543 0.3394 0.0678 0.2967 0.0227 
Log(Deprivation) 0.0353 0.0264 -0.0245 0.0353 0.0357 0.0404 0.0132 0.0135 
Log(External Grants pc) -0.0167 0.0046 -0.0250 0.0049 -0.0169 0.0036 -0.0131 0.0025 
Log(Labour vote share) 0.0038 0.0175 0.0157 0.0232 0.0040 0.0155 0.0052 0.0082 
Labour Control -0.0096 0.0078 -0.0069 0.0057 -0.0099 0.0061 -0.0002 0.0038 
Observations 886 738 886 1034 
Groups 148 148 148 148 
Wald-Chi2   1758.65   28064.09 
Notes: L SDV C robust standard errors computed through 5000 bootstrap replications.  LSDV C bias correction initialized by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) estimator. BBC initialization deterministic; resampling scheme wild bootstrap; 150 bootstrap samples used for 
inference. SW DEA scores computed through 2000 bootstrap replications. SW second stage computed through 5000 replications. 
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T able 4. Decentralization, deprivation and productive efficiency (DEA): Equation 2 
estimates. 
 LSDV C DIFF-GMM BBC SW 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
DEA scorest-1 0.3277 0.0372 0.4060 0.1530 0.3946 0.0971   
Log(Decentralization) 0.9857 0.1743 1.2547 0.3602 0.9968 0.3951 0.5981 0.0863 
Log(Deprivation) 0.6698 0.1678 0.7013 0.3336 0.6880 0.4047 0.3110 0.0831 
Log(External Grants pc) -0.0163 0.0046 -0.0227 0.0051 -0.0165 0.0035 -0.0129 0.0025 
Log(Labour vote share) -0.0051 0.0176 0.0090 0.0236 -0.0038 0.0166 0.0028 0.0082 
Labour Control -0.0086 0.0078 -0.0066 0.0057 -0.0086 0.0051 0.0000 0.0038 
Log(Dec)*Log(Deprivat) -0.2060 0.0540 -0.2405 0.1039 -0.2123 0.1234 -0.0961 0.0264 
Average Marginal Effects:         
Decentralization 0.3457 0.0485 0.5078 0.0543 0.337 0.0650 0.2996 0.0226 
Deprivation 0.0389 0.0264 -0.0350 0.0360 0.0380 0.0456 0.0168 0.0134 
Observations 886 738 886 1034 
Groups 148 148 148 148 
Wald-Chi2   1839.68   28448.37 
Notes: L SDV C robust standard errors computed through 5000 bootstrap replications.  LSDV C bias correction initialized by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. BBC initialization deterministic; resampling scheme wild bootstrap; 150 bootstrap 
samples used for inference. SW DEA scores computed through 2000 bootstrap replications. SW second stage computed 
through 5000 replications. 
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F igure 1. Time series variation in performance, expenditure, V alue-for-Money ratio and 
decentralization 
 
  
41 
 
 
 
F igure 2. Marginal effect of decentralization on V alue-for-Money contingent on 
deprivation 
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F igure 3. Marginal effect of decentralization on DEA scores contingent on deprivation 
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APPE NDIX  A 
T able A1. DEA model: summary statistics for outputs and inputs. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outputs     
Tons of waste per capita 
489.41 60.82 310.10 671.16 
Number of pupils sitting the GSCE exam 
3947.82 3020.10 428 16985 
Older people aged 65 or over helped to 
live at home per 1,000 population aged 65 
or over 
74.51 31.89 14.46 184.49 
Population 
340320.90 255212.50 35000 1405200 
Inputs     
Total service spending 
497679.50 300465.40 35618 2320854 
 
Data sources: 
 
- Department for Environment, Food & Rural A ffairs 
- Department for Education 
- Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) 
- Office for National Statistics (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) Mid-Year 
Population Estimates. ONS: Newport. 
- Audit Commission. 
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T able A2. Descriptive statistics and data sources; regression models. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Productive efficiency (performance/expenditure) 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.10 
Productive efficiency (conventional DEA 
estimates) 
0.61 0.18 0.23 1.00 
Productive efficiency (bootstrapped DEA 
estimates) 
0.57 0.15 0.22 0.94 
Fiscal decentralization 22.51 7.00 7.19 40.83 
Deprivation 24.68 10.55 4.89 61.34 
External grants pc 0.37 0.26 0.03 1.42 
Population 340320.90 255212.50 35000 1405200 
Labour vote share 30.57 11.82 0 69.7 
Labour Control 0.32 0.47 0 1 
 
Data sources: 
 
- Audit Commission (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment, London: Audit Commission.  
- Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) 
CIPFA Finance and General Statistics. London.   
- Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000) Index of Multiple Deprivation, 
DETR: London; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2004) The English indices of deprivation 
2004. London: ODPM; Department of Communities and Local Government (2007) The English 
indices of deprivation 2007. London: DCLG. 
- Office for National Statistics (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) Mid-Year Population 
Estimates. ONS: Newport. 
- Rallings C, Thrasher M, Local Elections Handbooks, 2001-2007 (LGC Elections Centre, University 
of Plymouth) 
 
 
